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NOTES
MASSACHUSETTS LAW-RELAXING THE ORGANIZED CRIME
REQUIREMENT

FOR

ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE:

A

CARTE

EAR"?-Commonwealth v. Thorpe,
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827, 424 N.E.2d 250; Commonwealth v.
Jarabek, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 49l.
BLANCHE FOR THE "UNIN,'ITED

It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and
unjust: and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed
upon the same principle.
Lord Camden, in Enlick v. Carrington, 1765. I

I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding the legality of warrants for the
search of persons or places and the seizure of property has continued
from the eighteenth century until today.2 One current focus of the
controversy has shifted from the old grievances of the ransacking of
persons' houses and seizure of papers by government agents 3 to the
problems of electronic surveillance brought about by an advancing
I. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. SI. Tri. 1030, 1073 (K.B. 1765) (Lord Camden
delivering the opinion of the court).
2. In fact the court's language in Entick indicates that the problem of search and
seizure was not unknown in the eighteenth century, and was controversial even then:
These warrants are not by custom; they go no farther back than 80 years; and
most amazing it is they have never before this time been opposed or contro
verted, considering the great men that have presided in the King's-Bench since
that time. But it was reserved for the honour of this Court, which has ever been
the protector of the liberty and the property of the subject, to demolish this
monster of oppression, and to tear to rags this remnant of Star-chamber
tyranny.
Id. at 1039.
3. Entick involved a general warrant issued for the seizure of all the plaintiffs
personal papers and delivery of the papers with the plaintiff to the Secretary of State,
Lord Halifax. The warrant was issued on information that the plaintiff was publishing a
seditious newspaper called the "monitor." Id. at 1034.
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technology. By the use of modem electronic devices placed within
buildings or on persons, government officials may "search" the mind
of an unsuspecting person, and "seize" his thoughts and words on a
tape for use at tria1. 4 The search and seizure controversy over elec
tronic surveillance first centered on the basic legality of the practice, 5
and more recently on the delicate problem of prescribing those situa
tions in which a warrant must precede any such surveillance. 6 Two
recent decisions from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
Commonwealth v. Thorpe 7 and Commonwealth v. Jarabek,8 illustrate
the problem of prescribing situations requiring a warrant and high
light the inability of courts to adequately define the boundaries of
warrant requirements. Although both decisions involved similar
factual situations, and were handed down on the same day, the hold
ings were opposite.
II.

FACTS

In Thorpe, the defendant, a retired policeman, offered to sell an
active duty officer a copy of an upcoming promotional exam. He
stated that the exam was available through an organization headed
by a woman. 9 The active duty officer advised his superiors, and,
with the cooperation of the State Police and the Attorney General's
office, plans were made to record subsequent conversations concern
ing the proposed sale.1O No attempt was made to obtain a warrant
under the applicable provisions of the commonwealth's electronic
4. Electronic surveillance was analogized to search and seizure in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51, 59 (1967).
5. The first judicial statement on the legality of electronic surveillance was in Olm
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). There, the Supreme Court upheld the testi
mony of a government official who secretly had overheard an incriminating conversation
from a tapped telephone wire. The court ruled that "search and seizure" in connection
with wiretapping was beyond the practical meaning of the fourth amendment and sug
gested that, if Congress wanted construction of the amendment to be so enlarged. it
should pass legislation to that effect. Id. at 465-66. Justice Brandeis dissented, maintain
ing that the act of wiretapping by the government official violated both the fourth and
fifth amendments. Id. at 479. In reviewing this controversy, a later court observed that
Olmstead caused such widespread dissatisfaction in Congress that the legislature eventu
ally effectively overruled it by enacting § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, of
June 19, 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976), which made wiretapping a federal
crime. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
7. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250.
8. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 491.
9. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1828-29,424 N.E.2d at 251.
10. Id. at 1829, 424 N.E.2d at 252.
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surveillance statute. I I
The active duty officer, using a portable radio transmitter, re
corded eight subsequent telephone conversations and two face to
face meetings with the defendant. 12 The superior court used the
tapes as evidence to indict Thorpe. After denying the defendant's
motion to suppress the tapes as evidence, the court granted an appli
cation for interlocutory appeaL 13 The appeal was based on two con
tentions: The state's use of warrantless recordings violated the state's
surveillance statute because.the requisite organized crime connection
was not shown; 14 and the use of warrantless recordings violated the
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches guaranteed
by the commonwealth's Declaration of Rights. 15
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the supe
rior court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence and re
manded the case for further proceedings. 16 The court concluded
that, with respect to the organized crime issue, the defendant's refer
ence to "an organization headed by a woman" was sufficient to fall
under the warrant exceptions of the statute since it created a reason
able suspicion that organized crime was involved. 17 As to the unrea
sonable search issue, the court asserted the "assumption of risk"
argument, which contends that one who speaks voluntarily assumes
the risk that the listener may repeat, monitor, or broadcast the con
versation to others. 18 The consequence of this argument is that there
II. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970).
12. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1829,424 N.E.2d at 252.
13. Id at 1828, 1831,424 N.E.2d at 250, 253.
14. Warrantless electronic recordings are permitted in Massachusetts when con
ducted by law enforcement officials, in connection with a designated offense involving
organized crime and when recorded either (a) by a consenting participant to the conver
sations or (b) by the law enforcement official who is a party to the conversation himself.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99B4 (West 1970).
15. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All war
rants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or function of them be
not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant
to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of the search, arrest, or seizure: and no
warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by
the laws.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, infra note 109.
16. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1828, 1842,424 N.E.2d at 250, 259.
17. Id at 1835-37, 424 N.E.2d at 255-56. By state statute, an organized crime
nexus is required in addition to one party consent. See supra note 14.
18. The "assumption of risk" doctrine in connection with surveillance by compan
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was no unreasonable search, no need for a warrant, and thus no con
stitutional privacy violation under the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 19
Jarabek, also dealt with warrantless surveillance. A local con
tractor, unable to complete work for the school board, was told that
his difficulties could be resolved if he made a contribution to defend
ant larabek's re-election committee. 20 The contractor, in coopera
tion with law enforcement authorities, recorded five subsequent face
to face interviews and several telephone conversations with the de
fendant and with his agent. As in Thorpe, the recordings were made
without obtaining a warrant. 21
The failure to comply with the statutory warrant requirements
led the superior court judge to suppress as evidence the tapes and the
testimony incident to the conversations. 22 As in Thorpe, the war
rantless surveillance issue reached the supreme judicial court by in
terlocutory appeal.2 3 The supreme judicial court upheld the lower
court's finding that there was no evidence of a "continuing conspir
acy", and thus a scheme by two municipal officials to extort a kick
back from a single contractor did not fall under the commonwealth's
statutory definition of organized crime. 24
In handing down these two simultaneous but opposite rulings,
the supreme judicial court attempted to draw the line for permissible
warrantless surveillance based on the notion of a continuing conspir
acy: Where a continuing conspiracy can be found, warrantless sur
veillance will be permitted. This note will focus on two issues that
have emerged as a consequence of Thorpe and Jarabek.
ions was first articulated in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966), and later
was reiterated in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
19. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1839,424 N.E.2d at 257.
20. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850,424 N.E.2d at 492.
21. Id at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 492.
22. Id at 1850,424 N.E.2d at 491.
23. Id
24. The Massachusetts statute requires that any warrantless surveillance must,
among other things, be an "investigation of a designated offense as defined herein."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970). The statute further states that
"[ t)he term 'designated offense' shall include the following offenses in connection with
organized crime as defined in the preamble . . . ." Id at § 99B7. The preamble defines
organized crime in the following terms: "[o)rganized crime, as it exists in the common
wealth today, consists of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disci
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services. In supplying these goods
and services organized crime commits unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tac
tics." Id at § 99A.
The court, however, did admit into evidence live testimony, finding no constitutional
bar to its admissibility. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1854,424 N.E.2d at 493-94.
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First, the continuing conspiracy, or the "Thorpe-Jarabek," stan
dard for warrantless surveillance as a judicially constructed replace
ment for the statutory requirement of the existence of organized
crime will be examined. The second part of the note will focus upon
the privacy issue raised in Thorpe.
III.

THE THORPE-JARABEK CONTINUING CONSPIRACY STANDARD
As A LIMITATION ON SURVEILLANCE

There is a direct relationship between the Thorpe-Jarabek stan
dard of organized crime and the limitations on electronic surveil
lance in Massachusetts. By examining Thorpe and Jarabek, and the
state and federal surveillance statutes, this section will argue that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has permitted the common
wealth to exercise surveillance powers broader than those intended
by the legislature.
A.

Statutory Background

Electronic surveillance statutes exist at both the federal2 5 and
state levels. 26 While Congress intended its legislation to occupy the
field,27 it specifically provided an enabling provision for state legisla
tion conceived within the federal boundary.28 This enabling provi
sion has been interpreted to mean that the federal statute should
serve as a minimum standard and that state surveillance statutes will
not be preempted if they are stricter than the federal standard. 29
l.

The Federal Statute

The nation's first federal wiretap statute was section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934,30 enacted largely in response to con
25. The current federal surveillance statute is the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 213·18, 222-23 (1970) (codified at 18
U.S.c. §§ 2511-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
26. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970).
27. United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 615 (D. Md. 1974); Commonwealth
v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 907 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 470, 481 n.9, cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 827
(1980); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 245, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (1975).
Where Congress has occupied the field, state legislation is preempted. For a general
discussion of the Preemption Doctrine, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CON
STITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978).
28. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 247, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (1975).
30. 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652,
Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103).
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gressional dissatisfaction with existing case law. 31 That statute pro
vided generally that persons transmitting or receiving wire or radio
communications were not to divulge the contents to anyone other
than the addressee, and that such communications were not to be
intercepted or published by anyone not authorized by the sender. 32
By the 1960's, it was becoming clear that the 1934 statute was inade
quate to deal with the increased threat to privacy that resulted from
the use of sophisticated electronic devices. 33 Congress responded by
amending section 605 with broad new provisions in Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 34
This statute is the currently effective federal statute governing
electronic surveillance. It prohibits the unauthorized interception,
use, or disclosure of wire or oral communications. 35 Authorized in
terceptions are permitted when used in connection with serious
offenses. 36
31. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Case law at that time stemmed from the first electronic surveillance case to reach the
Supreme Court, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the Court
allowed evidence from a warrantless telephone tap to stand because the tapping connec
tions were made in public places, and had resulted from no acts of trespass against plain
tiff's home, person, papers or effects. Id at 464-65.
.
32. 47 U.S.c. § 605 (1976).
33. For cases which mention or discuss this threat, see, e.g., United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 761-65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
46-49 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1961); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting); United States v. Carroll,
332 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008
09 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd, 433 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971).
For an example of the extremes to which agents will go to obtain surveillance, see
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (police officers
posing as students in classrooms).
The growing threat of increased surveillance aided by escalating technology has
been much discussed by commentators. See, e.g., M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS
151 (1964) (threat of new technology); G. McLELLAND, ed., THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 85
89 (1976) (spread of "wildcat surveillances," unrestricted computer surveillance, statu
tory loopholes); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 24-53 (2d ed. 1971) (rise of com
puters and data processing techniques in surveillance); W. PETROCELLI, Low PROFILE
173-79 (1981) (new devices such as the "bionic briefcase," shotgun microphones, the "in
finity transmitter," plus the growing threat of legal wiretapping by the telephone com
pany); J. RAINES, ATTACK ON PRIVACY 31-33,87 (1974) (political uses of surveillance);
R. SMITH, PRIVACY 229-79 (1979) (new devices such as "laser-beam bugs," "bumper
beepers" and the use of ultra-miniaturization technology); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 73-78 (1967) (various technological advances).
34. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2511-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
35. Id at § 2511(1)(a)-(c).
36. Serious offenses include espionage, sabotage or treason, 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1)(a)
(1976); illegal payments or loans to labor organizations, murder, kidnapping, robbery or
extortion, id at § 2516(l)(b); counterfeiting, id at § 2516(1)(d); bankruptcy fraud, id at
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Apart from the warrant provisions, the federal statute 37 spells
out two permissible circumstances for warrantless surveillance. A
person acting under color of law may make a warrantless intercep
tion either when such a person is party to the communication,38 or
when one of the parties to the communication has given prior con
sent to such interception. 39
Congress' intent in enacting this statute is well documented. Ti
tle III was drafted specifically to conform to the new constitutional
standards established by recent Supreme Court decisions. 40 The
overall and pervading purpose was to combat organized crime. 41
The statute has two additional purposes: first, to protect the privacy
of wire and oral communications; and second, to make the condi
tions, under which interception is permitted, uniform. 42 In connec
tion with this latter purpose, courts have found that Congress
intended Title III to serve as a minimum national standard for elec
tronic surveillance. 43 Therefore state surveillance statutes are valid
only to the extent that they are stricter than the federal standard. 44
2.

Massachusetts Statute

The Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, like its fed
eral counterpart, contains a general prohibition against interception
of communications, with limited exceptions. 45 One such exception is
an interception made under authorization of a warrant. 46 Further,
the statute specifies that the recording or transmitting of communica
§ 2516( 1)(e); and offenses under the general category of "racketeering", id at
§ 2516(1)(c).
37. 18 U.S.c. § 25 1\ (2)(c) (1976).
38. Id See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). There is also a provision for such persons not acting under
color of law, "unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
or of any State or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act." 18 U.S.c.
§ 251 I (2)(d) (1976).
39. Id See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40. The cases codified by the statute were Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See S. REP. No. \097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153.
41. Id at 70, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2157.
42. Id at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2153.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 907 n.9, 402 N.E.2d 470, 481
n.9 (1980).
44. See supra note 29.
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99CI (West 1970).
46. Id at § 99Dld.
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tions by law enforcement officials will not constitute an interception
if the official either is a party to such communication, or has prior
authorization to record or transmit by such a party, and, in both
cases, provided that the recording or transmission is made in the
course of an investigation of a designated otfense. 47 Designated of
fenses include a specified list of crimes in connection with organized
crime as defined in the statute's preamble. 48 By making such record
ings or transmissions exceptions to the interception definition, the
state statute permits warrantless surveillances if the recorder or
transmitter either is a party to the communication itself or has per
mission from one of the parties.
The Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute is stricter than
the federal one. The federal statute permits warrantless surveillance
in situations in which one party has consented or a law enforcement
officer is a party, while the state statute requires, in addition, that the
investigation concern organized crime.
B.

The Thorpe-Jarabek Anarysis

In Commonwealth v. Thorpe,49 the warrantless recordings made
by the active duty officer were permissible under the federal statute
because the recording officer was a party to the conversation. 50
Under Massachusetts law, the recording officer would have to have
been a party to the conversation, and, in addition, the recording
would have to have been made in connection with an investigation
of organized crime. 51 Defendant Thorpe argued that his act of sell
ing the exams was solitary and isolated and not indicative of organ
ized crime activity.52 Therefore, to hold the warrantless surveillance
legal, the commonwealth had to classify Thorpe's activity as "organ
ized crime."
In its attempt to classify Thorpe's activity, the court turned first
47. Id. at § 9984.
48. Id. at § 9987. The following are "designated offenses" in connection with or
ganized crime: arson; assault and battery with a dangerous weapon; extortion; bribery;
burglary; embezzlement; forgery; gaming, intimidation of a witness or juror; kidnapping;
larceny; lending violations; mayhem; murder; possession or sale of narcotics or harmful
drugs; perjury; prostitution; robbery; subornation of perjury; violations of the electronic
surveillance statute; and accessory to or conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the fore
going. Id.
49. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827, 424 N.E.2d 250.
50. See 18 U.S.c. § 2511(2)(c) (1976).
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970).
52. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1832,424 N.E.2d at 253.
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to the full definition of organized crime found in the preamble of the
surveillance statute:
The general court finds that organized crime exists within the
commonwealth and that the increasing activities of organized
crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare and safety.
Organized crime, as it exists in the commonwealth today, consists
of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disci
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services.
In supplying these goods and services, organized crime commits
unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tactics. Organized
crime is infiltrating legitimate business activities and depriving
honest businessmen of the right to make a living. 53

The court decided that only a portion of the preamble should consti
tute a definition of organized crime. It agreed with the lower court
that although the legislature declared that organized crime was de
fined in the preamble, the entire description of organized crime as
written therein could not have been intended to be incorporated into
the definition of designated offenses. 54 The court supported this in
terpretation by reasoning that "the statute would be unworkable if
the Commonwealth were required to prove, in every case, that the
activities [under investigation] constituted 'a grave danger to the
public welfare and safety,' that 'brutal and violent tactics' were em
ployed, and that 'legitimate business activities' were being infil
trated."55 The court concluded that of all the language used in the
preamble, it appeared that the legislature intended to define organ
ized crime as a " 'continuing conspiracy among highly organized and
disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and
services.' "56
In support of this statement, the court offered a footnote citation
to statutes in New Hampshire, New Mexico and Tennessee that fo
cus on the elements of discipline, organization, and the provision of
illegal goods and services. 57 Beyond that, the court offered no evi
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970).
54. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1833-34 n.6, 424 N.E.2d at 254 n.6. The New Hampshire statute defines
organized crime as "the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disci
plined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not lim
ited to homicide, gambling, prostitution, narcotics, marijuana or other dangerous drugs,
bribery, extortion, blackmail and other unlawful activities of members of such organiza
tions." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:IXI (1974).
The New Mexico Organized Crime Act states: "'organized crime' means the sup
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dence to support its contention that the legislature intended only part
of the preamble definition to apply.
Next, the court inquired whether an organized crime connection
existed prior to the Thorpe surveillance. Without such a prior con
nection, the surveillance would fail to meet the statutory warrantless
surveillance exception and therefore would be inadmissible. 58 The
only pre-surveillance evidence of organized crime presented to the
court was defendant Thorpe's initial statement that the examination
was available through an "organization headed by a woman."59
The court's inquiry additionally focused on the standard to
which the decision to intercept should be held. The court rejected
Thorpe's contention that a probable cause showing of the existence
of organized crime was necessary; it observed that probable cause is
the applicable standard when a warrant is sought and that it did not
believe that the legislature intended to require as stringent a showing
in situations in which warrantless surveillance is authorized. 60 The
court also rejected the commonwealth's position, which had been ac
cepted by the court below, that warrantless surveillance may be au
thorized on a good faith belief by officials. Instead, the court
prescribed an intermediate standard of reasonable suspicion. 61 The
court then proceeded to negate the effect of its rejection by stating
that even if a higher standard were necessary, this higher standard
would be met. The warrantless recording was permissible as evi
dence because Thorpe's "organization headed by a woman" state
ment was sufficient to indicate a reasonable suspicion of the presence
of organized crime. 62
plying for profit of illegal goods and services, including, but not limited to, gambling,
loan sharking, narcotics and other forms of vice and corruption, by members of a struc
tured and disciplined organization." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-2-A (1978).
The Tennessee statute states: "organized crime shall be defined as the unlawful ac
tivities of the members of an organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying
illegal goods and services, including, but not limited to, gambling, prostitution, loan
sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such
organizations. TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-102 (1982 Supp.).
Compare the definition in the federal statute: "'Organized crime' means the unlaw
ful activities of the members of a highly organized disciplined association engaged in
supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution,
loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of
such organizations." 42 U.S.c. § 3781(b) (1976).
58. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 9984 (West 1970).
59. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255. See supra note 9 and accom
panying text.
60. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255.
61. id. at 1836-37,424 N.E.2d at 255-56.
62. id. at 1837-38, 424 N.E.2d at 256.
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Thorpe has served to broaden the definition of organized crime
to encompass any "continuing conspiracy," which may be satisfied
by as small a showing as the statement "an organization headed by a
woman." The setting of a lenient standard for the showing of the
presence of organized crime means that increased levels of warrant
less surveillance will now be permissible in Massachusetts.
Jarabek, rendered the same day as Thorpe, turned on the new
judicial definition of organized crime. The court asserted that the
organized crime requirement in the Massachusetts surveillance stat
ute applied whether or not a warrant is obtained prior to the inter
ception. 63 The court upheld the decision below because the lower
court agreed with the Thorpe definition of organized crime. 64 Ob
serving that the Jarabek facts provided no evidence of a continuing
conspiracy, the court concluded that the commonwealth's statutory
definition did not include a scheme to extort kickbacks from a single
contractor. 65
The combined effect of these two cases is that the judicial defini
tion of organized crime in Massachusetts now has become a "contin
uing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to
engage in supplying illegal goods and services."66 The supreme judi
cial court's application of its new standard so far has shown only that
an organization selling exams fits the description, whereas a scheme
by municipal officials to extort a kickback does not.
C.

Definitional Problems with the Thorpe-Jarabek Standard

Taken together, Thorpe and Jarabek have the potential of be
coming a weak, confusing and inconsistent precedent for use by fu
ture courts or law enforcement officials in two critical areas: the
definition of organized crime as found within § 99 of the Massachu
setts General Laws; a,nd the definition's application to warrantless
surveillance situations. The definition of organized crime is critical
63. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852, 424 N.E.2d at 493. The court relied upon the
Massachusetts statute which states:
Upon a showing by the applicant that there is probable cause to believe that a
designated offense has been, or is about to be committed and that evidence of
the commission of such an offense may thus be obtained, or that information
which will aid in the apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable
cause to believe has committed, is committing or is about to commit a desig
nated offense may thus be obtained. . . .
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99E2 (West 1970).
64. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 493.
65. Id at 1852-53,424 N.E.2d at 493.
66. Id at 1833, 1852,424 N.E.2d at 254, 493.
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to law enforcement in Massachusetts because it delineates the point
where warrantless searches may begin and end. If the definition is
vague or blurred, the domain of warrantless surveillances may be
greatly widened, threatening the collective body of two hundred
years of fourth amendment protections. 67
The definition of organized crime which both Thorpe and
Jarabek developed is a "continuing conspiracy among highly disci
plined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services."68
The court, in composing this definition, abridged the legislature's
statutory definition by dropping three specific elements of organized
crime: that it must constitute a grave danger to public safety; that it
must employ brutal and violent tactics; and that it must infiltrate
legitimate business activities. 69 The court reasoned that the addi
tional elements made the definition unworkable. 70 This exercise in
judicial construction served only to shift the thrust of the definition,
not to clarify it.
1.

Legislative Intent

The supreme judicial court premised the adoption of its
abridged "workable" definition of organized crime on the idea that it
reflected the intent of the legislature. 71 This view, however, was not
unanimously accepted by the justices. Justice Liacos, dissenting in
Thorpe, stated that the conclusion of the majority was without sup
port in the record and contrary to the clear legislative history of the
statute. 72
An examination of the statute's legislative history supports the
dissent's interpretation of the intent of the legislature. Until 1968,
the Massachusetts surveillance statute was similar to that of New
York.73 In 1968, the Massachusetts legislature revised the surveil
lance statute to its present form.74 This revision followed a United
67. See infra text accompanying notes 108-37.
68. See supra note 66.
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A(West 1970).
70. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254. See also supra text accompa
nying note 55.
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
72. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1843,424 N.E.2d at 259 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
73. REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, S. Doc. No.
1132, 165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. 5 (1968).
74. The original changes proposed to the general court by the Senate would have
required a warrant for any interception not having the consent of an parties involved.
Id at II. The House version provided for only one party consent, and contained no
organized crime provision. H.R. Doc. No. 4875, 165th Gen. Ct. 2d Sess. 3 (1968). The
resulting statute was a compromise between the Senate version, Senate Bill 1218, and the
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States Supreme Court decision which invalidated the New York stat
ute and mandated that all aspects of electronic surveillance be
closely supervised. 75
Several significant points may be noted from the statute's his
tory. First, the purpose of the state surveillance statute, as with its
federal counterpart,16 was to fight organized crime, and to supervise
strictly all electronic surveillance.77 A strict supervision of electronic
surveillance is not consistent with the Thorpe court's broadening of
the boundaries of judicially permissible surveillance by expanding
the definition of organized crime.
Second, legislative history shows that the Massachusetts statute,
as originally proposed by the Special Commission on Eavesdrop
ping, was stricter than the final product in that it required two party
consent as a safeguard against the abuse of electronic surveillance.7 8
The proposal of the House Judiciary Committee included one party
consent for law enforcement officers, but no organized crime limita
tion.79 The final product was a compromise: It permitted one party
House version, re-written as House Bill number 4875, which was passed and enacted on
July 18, 1968. I JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP. 2316, 2442 (1968).
75. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court found that a
state statute, § 813 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, exceeded fourth
amendment warrant standards in the following areas: It authorized eavesdropping with
out requiring a probable cause showing; it gave authorization to "seize" conversations
without requiring a description in the warrant of what specific conversations or discus
sions were being sought; it placed no termination date on the eavesdrop after the conver
sation sought was "seized"; and it did not provide for the return of the warrant, leaving
too much discretion to law enforcement officials as to the use of the "seized" conversa
tions of innocent as well as guilty parties. Id at 59-60. Compare infra note 109.
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. The importance of permitting
some surveillance for fighting organized crime is re-emphasized in the letter from Gover
nor John Volpe to the House and Senate which accompanied House Bill 3797, and which
stated: "[I]aw enforcement officials elsewhere have found this technique to be a major
aid in tracking down and convicting members of the underworld." H.R. Doc. No. 3797,
165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
Moreover, in its report to the Massachusetts Senate, the Special Commission on
Eavesdropping stated:
The Commission feels that eavesdropping and wiretapping by law enforcement
officials should be permitted in order to effectively combat the menace of organ
ized crime, but only if such wiretapping and eavesdropping is limited by the
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court. This means that law
enforcement eavesdropping and wiretapping should be strictly supervised by the
judicial branch of the government. ...
REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N ON ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, S. Doc. No. 1132,
165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. at 7-8 (1968) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at II. (The statutory standard in Massachusetts at that time was one party
consent.)
79. 1968 H.R. Doc. No. 4875 at 3 (1968).
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consent in electronic surveillance, but limited such surveillance to
investigations "of offenses in connection with organized crime as de
fined in the preamble."80 The organized crime provision thus served
as an offset and limitation against the greater police powers permit
ted by the single party consent provision. 81
The Thorpe majority recognized the difficulty of construing leg
islative intent:
No indication exists, either in the words· of the preamble or in the
published legislative history of G.L. c. 272 § 99 ... that the Leg
islature intended to limit the statute's application to persons with
the status of full-time professional criminals-or, in the precise
words of the dissent, "to those notorious and readily recognized
highly 'structured criminal syndicate[s] composed of professional
criminals who primarily rely on unlawful activity as a way of
life,' " . . . Such a limiting definition would insulate from elec
tronic surveillance all criminal activity, no matter how organized,
disciplined, and repeated, carried on by those who maintain legiti
mate jobs, perhaps in the public service, while at the same time
committing the designated offenses set forth in G.L. c. 272, § 99 B
7. 82

Two points may be made in rebuttal to the majority's assertion.
First, while it may be true that there are no specific words which
limit the statute to "structured criminal syndicates," the description
of organized crime provided in the preamble such as, for example,
"brutal and violent tactics"83 indicates that the legislature intended
the statute to apply to more than a mere conspiracy. Second, al
though as the majority states, there are no specific words limiting the
statute to "full-time professional criminals," the legislative history
shows that the organized crime provisions were intended specifically
to limit police surveillance powers. All through the legislative his
tory, and in the statute itself, the words "strict judicial supervision"
and "limitation" appear repeatedly.84
In view of this, it is difficult to see how the Thorpe majority
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 99A, 99B7 (West 1970).
81. This point is conceded by the Thorpe majority. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1836
n.7, 424 N.E.2d at 255 n.7.
82. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1834 n.6, 424 N.E.2d at 254 n.6.
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970).
84. See supra note 77. The preamble to the current statute echoes this theme:
"[t)he use of such devices by law enforcement officials must be conducted under strict
judicial supervision and should be limited to the investigation of organized crime." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970) (emphasis added).
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could be serving the intent of the legislature, as it says,85 by using the
organized crime definition to expand the impact of police electronic
surveillance, rather than limit it. The legislature's intent was that the
organized crime provision would be used to limit access to warrant
less surveillances, not to expand it. The dissent of Justice Liacos is
correct: The majority view of Thorpe is contrary to the clear legisla
tive history of the statute. 86
In addition to misreading the statute's intent, the court com
posed a definition of organized crime which left several terms unde
fined: "continuing conspiracy"; "highly disciplined"; and "illegal
goods and services." A clearer understanding of these elements is
needed if Thorpe and Jarabek are to be of any value for future
courts.
2.

Defining "Continuing Conspiracy"

Conspiracy was defined at common law as a combination be
tween two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act,
or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. 87 Under this
definition, the activities of both Thorpe and Jarabek would consti
tute a conspiracy.88 Yet when the supreme judicial court set out to
define "continuing conspiracy", only the Thorpe activities were in
cluded. While qualifying as a traditional conspiracy, the activities of
Jarabek were not considered a "continuing conspiracy."89
In drawing this line, the court failed to explain why the Thorpe
conspiracy of an organization headed by a woman might be more
85. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254.
86. Id at 1842 (Liacos, I., dissenting).
87. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) III, 121-22 (1842).
88. In Thorpe, the criminal or unlawful act for which the defendant was indicted
was violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 2(a)(2) (West 1970) (influencing a
state employee in the commission of a fraud upon the commonwealth). Brief for the
Appellee-Commonwealth at 2, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424
N.E.2d 250. The two or more person requirement is satisfied by defendant Thorpe's
statement that the exam came from "an organization headed by a woman," 1981 Mass.
Adv. Sh. at 1828.
In Jarabek, the criminal or unlawful act for which the defendant was indicted was
violation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 2(b) (West 1970) (public employee solic
iting something of value in return for performance), and § 3(b) (West 1970) (solicitation
of gifts), and of conspiracy to violate both of these statutes. Brief for the Commonwealth
at I, Commonwealth v. Iarabek, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,424 N.E.2d 491. The two or
more person requirement is satisfied because defendant Iarabek was working through
and in conjunction with an agent. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850-51,424 N.E.2d at 492.
89. Specifically the court said: "it appears the legislature intended to define organ
ized crime as 'a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups'
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 492.
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"continuing" than was the Jarabek conspiracy to extort political
kickbacks. On the surface, the facts of Thorpe and Jarabek shed no
light on the distinction of conspiracies which the supreme judicial
court found between the two cases. The supreme judicial court
needs to articulate more clearly what facts operate to give rise to a
"continuing conspiracy."
3.

Defining "Highly Disciplined"

A similar criticism may be addressed to the court's use of the
term "highly disciplined." Two problems emerge from the court's
failure to delineate adequately the meaning of "highly disciplined"
within its definition of organized crime. First, there exists an inter
nal inconsistency within Thorpe. While the court observed that the
legislature intended to define organized crime as "highly organized
and disciplined,"90 it found from the Thorpe facts only that a "cer
tain amount" of organization and discipline would be required to
acquire and supply the examinations illicitly.91 The difficulty is that
the second standard is necessarily much looser and may be used to
label as organized crime almost any conspiracy. As Justice Liacos
points out in his dissent, one could easily infer that a "certain
amount" of organization and discipline would be required to achieve
the objectives of any conspiracy.92 But, the preamble to the Massa
chusetts surveillance statute indicates that it was not the legislture's
intent that every conspiracy be labelled "organized crime."93
The second difficulty with the "highly disciplined" definition is
that the standard employed in Jarabek is not consistent with that in
Thorpe. Using its Thorpe analysis, the court could have inferred
that a "certain amount" of organization and discipline would be re
quired of a public works kickback conspiracy. Yet the court chose
instead to apply the stricter "highly organized and disciplined" stan
dard94 to exclude the Jarabek activities as an organized crime activ
ity. In effect, this served to create two different standards. The
90. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852-53,424 N.E.2d at 493.
91. Id at 1837,424 N.E.2d at 256.
92. Id at 1845-46, 424 N.E.2d at 261.
93. This can be seen by the narrow focus of the preamble's definition: specifically,
its mention of the employment of brutal and violent tactics and of the infiltration of
legitimate businesses. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99A (West 1970). As an exam
ple, a conspiracy by two bank employees to embezzle funds from their employer is a
conspiracy under the common law definition but would not be organized crime under the
statutory preamble definition because it doesn't involve brutal tactics. Under Thorpe
however, it could become organized crime by being labeled a "continuing conspiracy."
94. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,424 N.E.2d at 493.
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supreme judicial court has again failed to show what specific facts
serve to constitute the standard which it wishes to prevail. Future
courts have been left with no guidelines as to what facts to apply in
what circumstance.
4.

Defining "Illegal Goods and Circumstances"

The role that "illegal goods and services" play in the Thorpe
Jarabek standard is similarly unclear. The activities in both cases
were considered by the commonwealth to be an "illegal good or
service."95 In the absence of specific reasoning by the court as to
why the Jarabek activity failed to meet the definition of organized
crime, a future court may speculate that it was the absence of an
illegal good or service that caused the kickback scheme to fail the
organized crime test. In failing to enumerate what standards were
applied, or to distinguish the seeming inconsistencies within and be
tween the two opinions, the supreme judicial court has opened the
door for easy manipulation of facts and decisions by future courts.
Interpretational flexibility is not a wise policy for fashioning the defi
nition of organized crime because broad definitions may permit
greater incidence of electronic surveillance.

5.

Explaining the Inconsistencies

Taken together, the two cases make little sense. The underlying
policies which may have caused the supreme judicial court to distin
guish the two cases are not articulated. Indeed, the decisions seem
highly result-oriented. It may have been that by broadening the or
ganized crime definition beyond the statutory requirement that pub
lic safety be threatened, brutal tactics be employed, and legitimate
businesses be infiltrated,96 the court was attempting to remove or
ganized crime identification from the narrower field traditionally
thought of as the "mafia." There was some support for this idea in
the commonwealth's briefs, in which it was argued rather extensively
that organized crime today means more than the traditional notion
of "mafia."97
If this was the court's aim, the policies and interests behind the
decision are still not well served because the facts necessary to estab
95. See supra note 88.
96. These elements were originally contained in the statute's definition of organ
ized crime, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, but were dropped by the Thorpe
court, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1833,424 N.E.2d at 254.
97. Brief for Appellee-Commonwealth at 4-18, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250.
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lish the new organized crime definition-the "continuing conspir
acy"-remain unarticulated. 98
Alternatively, the decision in Thorpe may have been influenced
by knowledge about a woman who previously had been involved in
fixing civil service exams. 99 Nothing in the facts indicates that such a
connection was made; but, if it was, then the woman's on-going
exam-fixing activities certainly could have served to put Thorpe
more into the realm of a "continuing conspiracy" than a single iso
lated event. The Jarabek scheme, on the other hand, had no such
implication of past repetitive abuses, and it may be that is why the
court decided the Jarabek activities were not of a continuing nature.
A third explanation for the inconsistency of Thorpe and
Jarabek may be that Thorpe was a result-oriented decision; and the
supreme judicial court, realizing that the Thorpe rationale could be
carried to an extreme result, offered Jarabek as an immediate limita
tion. The court showed a sensitivity to the dangers of a Thorpe pre
cedent when it stated that, despite its decision, a better future course,
and the most secure one constitutionally, would be for law enforce
ment officials to procure warrants in cases where probable cause can
be shown. loo In setting forth a broad new proposition and then fail
ing to apply it in a similar circumstance, the supreme judicial court
may have attempted to signal that Thorpe should be limited to its
facts.
Regardless of the reasons or policies behind the supreme judi
cial court's actions, the results are unsettling. When guidelines and
definitions are left vague, those who must make future decisions
98. Some courts have chosen to identify organized crime by a "pattern of racke
teering" analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975).
Under this analysis, there must be two acts of racketeering activity committed within ten
years for the behavior to constitute organized crime. Id at 364. "Racketeering activity"
has been defined by both statute, 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1981) (delineating specific
offenses), and by courts, see, e.g., United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) (racke
teering activity must be an act subject to criminal sanction and any proscribed act in the
pattern must violate an independent statute).
99. Briefs for both parties make references to a woman known to have been in
volved in past schemes to fix or alter examinations. In the Commonwealth's brief, refer
ence was made to an opinion of one of the Assistant Attorneys General supervising the
case "that the defendant was connected with Esther Bell in the thefts and dissemination
of the examinations." Esther Bell had entered a plea of guilty to changing grades on a
civil service promotional exam. Brief, supra note 97, at 22.
The defendant's brief touches on the same point, in describing the testimony of a
state police lieutenant who "had been involved in previous Civil Service investigations
and that a female had been indicted." Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 23, Common
wealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250.
\00. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1842,424 N.E.2d at 259.
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about warrants for electronic surveillance will be left free to expand
police powers at their discretion. For example, in a recent Massa
. chusetts Superior Court case, Commonwealth v. Blood,101 warrantless
surveillances were upheld against a burglary defendant. The court
applied the Thorpe "continuing conspiracy" standard and found the
defendant's conspiracy to constitute organized crime essentially be
cause he and his co-conspirator were repeat offenders. 102
By failing to define clearly the elements of its new "continuing
conspiracy" definition, or to articulate what facts operate to consti
tute such a conspiracy, the supreme judicial court has allowed an
expanding organized crime definition to serve as a vehicle by which
to permit the employment of more warrantless electronic
surveillances.
IV.

THE PRIVACY ISSUE

The privacy issue raised in Thorpe centered around a claimed
violation of Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 103
The privacy issue was not raised in Jarabek. The privacy rights em
anating from both the state and federal constitutions are closely in
tertwined. The supreme judicial court acknowledged this
constitutional interdependence in Commonwealth v. Vitello, 104 a case
involving the validity of the state surveillance statute. The Massa
chusetts court stated that a detailed analysis of fourth amendment
philosophy and federal surveillance cases was to be incorporated by
reference into its opinion and considered an expression of the hold
ing. 10S The Thorpe court re-emphasized the importance of the fed
eral-state constitutional relationship by relying upon federal
authority to respond to the defendant's claim 106 and by advancing
101. 3 MSupp. 288 (1982).
\02. Specifically, the court found evidence that "'highly organized and disci
plined' groups worked together over a period of time and engaged in burglaries that
. displayed a particular pattern." Id at 295.
\03. See supra note 15.
104. 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975).
\05. Id at 242, 327 N .E.2d at 831.
106. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1838,424 N.E.2d at 256-57. In response to defendant's
claim of violation of the state constitution's privacy guarantees, the Thorpe court cited
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The three Massachusetts deci
sions cited by Thorpe all resort to federal authority for the search and seizure and privacy
issues. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 794-95, 323 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Dinnall, 366 Mass. 165, 166-67,314 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1974); and Com
monwealth v. Douglas, 354 Mass. 212, 221-22, 236 N.E.2d 865, 871-72 (1968), cerf. de
nied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969).
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the "assumption of risk" argument which had evolved in the United
States Supreme Court. 107 An understanding of the development of
the privacy doctrine in federal courts will provide an insight into the
doctrine as incorporated within Massachusetts law.
A.

Development

of the Privacy Doctrine

The idea of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
so deep-rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition that jurists on
both sides of the Atlantic were describing the right as "fundamental"
over two hundred years ago. 108
107. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1839,424 N.E.2d at 257. The "assumption of risk"
argument, which states that one contemplating illegal activity must assume the risk that
his companions may be reporting to the police, was first articulated in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) and was later n:iterated in United States v. Whit,e, 401
U.S. at 752 (1971).
108. The right to privacy has existed in Anglo-American law for at least two hun
dred years. James Otis argued against general writs in the Petition of Lechmere, in what
is now the Old State House in Boston, and declared in February 1761 that general writs
"violated the fundamental principle that a man should be secure in his own house." 2 L.
WROTH & H. ZOBEL, THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 114-15 (1965). The court,
however, saw it differently and afteia second hearing in November 1761 decided unani
mously in favor of the writ. Id. at 115. The unpopularity of this decision with the colo
nists may be attested to by the observation of eyewitness John Adams who, looking back
some fifty years later remembered: "then and there the child Independance [sic] was
born." Id. at 107.
The right to privacy has been officially protected by the tort invasion of privacy
since its general acceptance by most American jurisdictions during the 1930s. Recogni
tion of this right came largely as a result of publicity generated from the 1890 Warren
and Brandeis article "The Right to Privacy." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 802-04 (4th ed. 1971). See infra note 115.
Although not a legally recognized right in earlier times, the idea of a right of privacy
was often mentioned in dicta and statements ofjudicial philosophy. Judge Thomas Coo
ley planted the seed for the legal profession's modem interest by noting in 1888 that
people had a "right to be let alone." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29
(2d ed. 1888). Judge Story wrote in 1841 that the violation of correspondence "strikes at
the root of all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions, and sentiments. . .
[that] is so essential to the well-being of society." A. WESTIN, supra note 33, at 336.
Many have traced the right to privacy back through various amendments of the Bill
of Rights, inferring it from the first amendment's prohibition of scrutiny of political ex
pression, the third amendment's prohibition of the practice of quartering troops, the
fourth amendment's prohibition against general searches, and the fifth amendment's pro
hibition against the compelling of self-incrimination. See J. RAINES, supra note 33, at
115. In one of the broadest examples of judicial activism, Justice Douglas found the
right of privacy in the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments,
while two of his COlleagues located it more simply in the due process clause of the four
teenth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Justice Doug
las was joined in this by Justices Harlan, id. at 500-02, and White, id. at 502-07. For a
general background survey on the right to privacy, see A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY (3d ed. 1971). For an excellent background on the basis for the fourth
amendment right to privacy, see D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38-78
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After independence was achieved, the founders of the new na
tion attempted to eliminate forever the perceived abuses of the com
mon practice which authorized searches of individual's homes
pursuant to general warrants. 109 The drafters of the constitution
wrote their prohibition expressly into the constitution by way of the
fourth amendment. I 10
The privacy violations resulting from general warrants were
equally as offensive and traditionally disliked in England. In Entick
v. Carrington, III a general warrant permitted a house search of a
man suspected of printing seditious newspapers. 112 The court said of
such illegal searches that they were "monstrous indeed! and if. . .
lawful, no man could endure to live in this country." I 13 Lord Cam
den, who delivered the opinion in Entick, was sensitive not only to
the property trespass involved, but also to the privacy invasion
which such searches worked: "For ransacking a man's secret draw
ers and boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his
body to come at his secret thoughts." 114
The idea that privacy and property were intertwined was an
idea which gathered growing favor in America and reached its ulti
(1979). For an examination of the role of privacy in judicial philosophy, see generally
Miller, Privacy in the Modern Corporate State: A Speculative Essay, 25 AD. L. REV. 231
(1973); Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281
(1966).
109. General warrants or general writs as they were sometimes called originated in
England from the practice by which justices issued search warrants for the seizure of
stolen property. The use of search warrants expanded slowly and imperceptibly to per
mit searches among the papers of political suspects. When the specificity requirements of
search warrants became burdensome, the practice evolved to one of issuing the general
warrant, which authorized the King's agents to arrest anyone and search any house to
apprehend unnamed authors and seize private papers. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches
and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1921). In the American colonies, the prac
tice was employed by issuing similarly broad writs of assistance to revenue officers to
search suspected places for smuggled goods. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1886).
110. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu
larly describing the places to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. That these provisions were written in response to perceived
abuses of general warrants has long been recognized by American courts. See, e.g. , Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. at 626-27.
III. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
112. Id at 1038.
113. Id
114. Id
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mate expres~ion in the well-known Brandeis and Warren privacy ar
ticle of 1890.115 Contemporaneously, the United States Supreme
Court broadened considerably the concept of privacy by finding that
both the fourth and fifth amendments interacted to create a compre
hensive right of privacy in a search and seizure case. 116 In Boyd v.
United States, 117 the Court echoed words of an earlier era, noting
that it was not the breaking of a person's doors or the rummaging of
his drawers that constituted the essence of the offense, but rather the
invasion of his indefinable right of personal security, personal lib
erty, and private property. I IS Subsequent courts have frequently
noted the soundness of the Boyd principle that the fourth and fifth
amendments interact to create a right of privacy. I 19
Despite the fact that principles of property and privacy were
connected at an early stage, the first electronic surveillance cases did
not employ this interrelation analysis. In Olmstead v. United
States,120 a divided Court l21 applied the traditional property ap
proach to a wiretap situation, and held that, in the absence of tres
pass, there could be no fourth amendment search and seizure
violation associated with the wiretap.122
The Olmstead property perspective of fourth amendment rights
was controlling law for over twenty-five years. 123 Nevertheless, a
115. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). The
authors explored this intricate interrelationship by observing that the law had grown in
response to the nation's expanding emotional, intellectual and technological life, so that
the concept of property had broadened to encompass every form of possession, intangible
as well as tangible. Id at 194-95. Intangible property included a right to privacy, or a
right to be "let alone", id at 195, such that, even if a person had chosen to give his
thoughts expression, he generally retained the powers to fix the limits of the publicity
which shall be given them. Id at 198.
116. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The plaintiff protested that a
court order to produce the invoices for disputed goods was a violation of his fifth amend
ment rights. The court agreed, finding not only a violation of the fifth amendment privi
lege against self-incrimination, but also a violation of the fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. Id at 630.
117. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
118. Id at 630. Compare supra text accompanying note 114 (Lord Camden's state
ment in 1765).
119. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
121. The Court was split 5-4, with dissents written by Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
Butler, and Stone. Id at 469-88.
122. The case concerned government officials who made tapping connections to
telephone lines in public locations. In the absence of acts of trespass against the plain
tiffs house, person, papers or effects, the Olmstead Court refused to find a search or
seizure. Id at 464-65.
123. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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philosophical split, beginning with the dissent of Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead,124 divided the Court for that entire period of time. Nar
row majorities continued to uphold the Olmstead property analysis
of search and seizure,125 while dissenting minorities argued from En
tick, Boyd, and the Brandeis and Warren article that warrantless
surveillance should be prohibited as a violation of the privacy right
guaranteed under the fourth amendment. 126 The persuasive force of
124. See infra note 126.
125. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court upheld evidence
from a detectaphone placed outside a hotel room wall without a warrant. As in Olm
stead, the absence of a trespass precluded the Court from finding a fourth amendment
violation. Id at 134-35. The Court delivered the decision with a 5-3 split; dissents were
written by Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Murphy, with Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Frankfurter indicating an express desire to have Olmstead overruled. Id at 136 (dissent
ing opinion).
In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a friend of the plaintiff entered the
plaintiffs laundry acting as an undercover agent and wearing a concealed transmitter
which relayed incriminating statements to an outside receiver. The evidence was upheld
because the agent's presence in the laundry was consensual and not a trespass. Id at
751-52. Here the Court was split 5-4, with dissents written by Justices Frankfurter,
Douglas, Burton, and Black. Justice Black stated that he believed the district court
should have rejected the evidence challenged. Id at 758 (dissenting opinion).
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), involved tapes of conversations made
by an I.R.S. agent who had been offered a bribe. Id at 430. Again, the majority of a
split Court rejected the plaintiffs privacy argument and upheld the property principles of
Olmstead and Goldman. Id at 438, 441.
126. In his memorable dissent in Olms/ead, Justice Brandeis argued from Boyd
that protection against invasion of the "sanctities of a man's horne and the privacies of
life" was provided in the fourth and fifth amendments by specific language. And, taking
note of the growing means of government espionage heralded by the advent of wire
tapping even then (1928), he warned:
'That places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer' was
said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To Lord Camden, a far
slighter intrusion seemed 'subversive of all the comforts of society'. Can it be
that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?
277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Dissenting in Goldman, Justice Murphy relied on the Brandeis and Warren privacy
article, as well as Entick, Boyd, and the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead to assert: "On the
value of the right of privacy, as dear as any to free men, ... [s]uffice it to say that the
spiritual freedom of the individual depends in no small measure upon the preservation of
that right." Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Dissenting in Lopez, Justice Brennan similarly alluded to Entick, Boyd, and the
Brandeis dissent in Olmstead, to criticize:
Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as limited to the
tangible fruits of actual trespasses was a departure from the Court's previous
decisions, notably Boyd, and a misreading of the history of the purpose of the
Amendment. Such a limitation cannot be squared with a meaningful right to
inviolate personal liberty. It cannot even be justified as a 'literal' reading of the
Fourth Amendment.
.
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-55, 459 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the privacy argument was recognized by Justice Douglas when he
observed that the issue was "constantly stirred by those dissents."127
A shift in the philosophical balance of fourth amendment doc
trine finally occurred in 1967 in two Supreme Court decisions: Ber
ger v. New York l28 and Katz v. United States}29 Berger identified
electronic surveillance as a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, thereby requiring that warrants for such sur
veillances meet the warrant standards for other fourth amendment
searches. DO Katz occasioned the final demise of the Olmstead prop
erty analysis for fourth amendment surveillances. In Katz, the Court
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."l3l
This statement sent out a new signal that privacy, not trespass, was
the appropriate inquiry for fourth amendment surveillance
problems. 132
The constitutional boundaries for electronic surveillance were
further defined in 1971 when the Supreme Court decided United
States v. White. 133 There, the Court upheld warrantless evidence ob
tained in a consensual recording, based on an "assumption of risk"
doctrine. 134 Although the White Court stated that the warrantless
surveillance involved did not violate the fourth amendment, it
127. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
130. 388 U.S. at 63-64. In Berger, the issue revolved around a court order for the
bugging of an office. In prior cases of warrantless surveillance, the Court had avoided
invoking a fourth amendment analysis by finding no physical trespass. Here, however,
there was a warrant, and the Court's scrutiny focused on the warrant and the statute
under which it was issued, and on the fourth amendment standards for such. In this way,
the Court's reasoning was led to apply fourth amendment guarantees to the area of elec
tronic surveillance. Id. at 59-60.
131. 389 U.S. at 350-51.
132. In Katz, law enforcement agents attached an electronic listening and record
ing device to the outside of a public telephone booth. Justice Stewart, writing for the
court, ushered in a new era for the protection of privacy when he stated:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in elec
tronically listening to and recording the petitioner'S words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus con
stituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen
to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.
389 U.S. at 353.
133. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
134. Id. at 749. See also supra note 107.
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pointed out that its decision was based on pre-Katz law.135 Once
again the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of electronic sur
veillance, with dissents written by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and
Marshall. 136
As it presently stands, the law on electronic surveillance is a
clouded mixture of Katz and White.137 The force of Katz's inclusion
of electronic surveillance under the umbrella of the fourth amend
ment has been somewhat diluted by White which has excluded war
rantless recordings from fourth amendment protection where one
party to the recording has consented. 138 The impact of White how
ever has also been diluted; its reliance on pre-Katz law, and the per
suasive force of its dissenting opinions have left it vulnerable to
criticism from diverse sources.139
B.

The Privacy Issue Raised by Thorpe

The defendant in Thorpe asserted that his privacy rights, as
guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions, had been vio
lated. 140 On appeal to the supreme judicial court, defendant aban
doned his federal constitutional challenge and advanced his privacy
violation claim based solely on the state constitution. 141 Nonethe
less, the response of the supreme judicial court embodied a discus
sion of federal constitutional authorityI42 and relied on the federally
created doctrine of "assumption of risk,"143 as advanced in United
135. The warrantless surveillances occurred in 1965 and 1966; Katz was decided in
1967. Since Katz was not retroactive, the Court ruled that its decision should be based
on the pre-Katz law of electronic surveillance, as exemplified in On Lee. Id at 754.
136. Id at 756-96 (dissenting opinions).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). For varying interpre
tations of the manner in which Katz and White have been interpreted, see infra notes
164-68 and accompanying text.
138. 401 U.S. at 749.
139. See infra notes 157-59, 164-68 and accompanying text.
140. Specifically, defendant asserted a violation of his privacy right as guaranteed
under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1831,424 N.E.2d at 253.
141. Id
142. The cases relied upon by the Supreme Judicial Court were either federal
cases, or state cases citing federal authority. See supra note 106.
Nowhere in its opinion does the Thorpe court state the relationship between the state
constitutional privacy provision in article 14 and the federal provision in the fourth
amendment. Instead, the court concludes, after discussing the line of federal authority
on privacy: "In the case at bar we find no violation of the State Constitution. . . . This
is not the type of warrantless surveillance condemned by the courts and commentators
discussed above . . . ." 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1841,424 N.E.2d at 258.
143. See supra note 107.
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States v. White .144
This section will argue that the Thorpe court's reliance on
White's "assumption of risk" doctrine is insecure because of the logi
cal inconsistencies of the doctrine itself, and because of the recog
nized weakness of White as precedent.
1.

Criticism of The "Assumption of Risk" Doctrine

The "assumption of risk" doctrine has been criticized by both
judges and commentators for drawing a faulty analogy between the
ordinary eavesdropper and one who is electronically bugged. Dis
senting in United Slales v. Lopez, 145 Justice Brennan observed a
qualitative difference between electronic and conventional eaves
dropping.146 Whereas conventional eavesdroppers may be shut out
of a conversation by the lowering of voices or the withdrawal of the
speaker to a more private place, the electronic eavesdropper may not
be so easily excluded. Justice Brennan concluded that the only way
to guard against such a risk "is to keep one's mouth shut on all
occasions." 147
Similarly, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Uniled Slates v.
While,148 called electronic surveillance the "greatest leveler of
human privacy ever known."149 He further said that to equate
eavesdropping and electronic surveillance is like treating "man's first
gunpowder on the same level of the nuclear bomb."150 He further
observed that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were not to be
read as covering only the technology known in the eighteenth
century. 151
144. See supra note 134.
145. 373 U.S. 427, 446-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 465-66.
147. Id. at 450. Both the federal and state statutes provide that conversations may
be monitored with the consent of one of the parties. See supra notes 37-39 and accompa
nying text. Justice Brennan criticized this statutory distinction which would permit sur
veillances where at least one party to the conversation consents, but which would
preclude surveillances where neither party has consented to being monitored by a third
party. Justice Brennan argued that the distinction thus made is entirely fictitious because
the ensuing privacy violation to a speaker is equal regardless of whether the other party
to the conversation has consented to electronic monitoring. 373 U.S. at 452. The sensi
ble solution for Brennan is not consensual one-party surveillance, but rather no warrant
less surveillance at all; in a later case, he stated that he would have required a warrant for
the surveillances conducted in On Lee, Lopez and While. United States v. White, 401
U.S. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
148. 401 U.S. 745, 756-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 756.
ISO. Id.
lSI. Id.
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Commentators also have found fault with the "assumption of
risk" doctrine. One commentator has questioned why, even if it is
"reasonable" to require individuals to assume the risk that those in
whom they confide are secret agents, it is also reasonable to require
the same individuals to assume the risk that the "agents" are elec
tronically recording or transmitting their conversations. 152 The
problem foreseen is that, in a society where people are increasingly
apprehensive of being monitored and recorded, free expression will
be inhibited. 153
The underlying premise of the "assumption of risk" doctrine,
that electronic surveillance is no more harmful than ordinary ea ves
dropping, has been derided by another commentator as "wildly be
side the point." 154 Justifying official electronic surveillance by
saying the speaker assumes the risk is like justifying an official
break-in to a car by saying that the owner assumed the risk it would
be burglarized when he parked it. 155

2.

Criticism of While as Precedent

Several state courts have shown a trend towards expanding state
guarantees of privacy, thereby diminishing the impact of While. The
Alaska Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision,156 took note of the Bren
nan dissent in Lopez and the split decision in While and ruled that
warrantless recording by a police informant was inadmissible as a
violation of a person's reasonable expectations that the conversation
will not be secretly recorded. 157 In so doing, the Alaska court con
strued its state constitutional privacy provision 158 as a general prohi
bition on the warrantless monitoring of conversations. 159
The Supreme Court of Florida has also ruled against warrant
152. Stone, The Scope oj the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use oj
Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1193, 1253-54 (1976).
Stone carries this inquiry to the threshold by questioning the "reasonableness" of the first
assumption that individuals must assume the risk that persons in whom they confide are
secret agents. lei.
153. lei. at 1254.
154. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
406-07 (1974).
155.

156.

lei.

State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
157. lei. at 876-77, 879-80.
158. lei. at 879-82. The full privacy provision from the Alaska constitution reads:
"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legisla
ture shall implement this section." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
159. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978).
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less electronic surveillance, even where one party has consented. 160
There, the state constitution's search and seizure provision was ex
panded to cover "unreasonable interception of private communica
tions,"'61 and the addition of these words was deemed sufficient to
override the White court's decision that consenting parties to a con
versation may escape the warrant requirement. '62
The constitutions of both Alaska and Florida have provisions
beyond the search and seizure guarantees of the federal Constitu
tion. Nonetheless the courts in both states felt compelled to distin
guish White before proceeding to their conclusion. 163
A situation more closely analogous to Massachusetts is found in
Michigan. There, as in Massachusetts, privacy rights are derived di
rectly from a search and seizure statute which is modeled after the
fourth amendment.'64 In a 1975 case,165 a defendant argued from
Katz before the Michigan Supreme Court that an expanded right of
privacy included freedom from warrantless surveillance, even in the
situation where one party consented. 166 The state argued that White
was controlling.
The Michigan court noted White was a plurality opinion, and
stated it was most persuaded by the dissent of Justice Harlan which
rejected the "assumption of risk" argument. 167 Relying on Katz and
the Harlan dissent in White, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that
third-party monitored conversations, whether transmitted by a party
or consenting person, would require a warrant. The court also noted
160. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490,494 (Fla. 1973).
161. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. The Florida search and seizure provision, which is
identical with the fourth amendment, was revised in 1968 by the addition of protections
against "unreasonable interception of private communications by any means" and the
further requirement that "the communications to be intercepted, and the nature of evi
dence to be obtained" be included in the warrant. Id
162. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490,493 (Fla. 1973).
163. Id at 492-93; State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 1978).
164. The Michigan search and seizure provision states:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not
be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic
drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a
peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.
MICH. CONST. art. I, § II. Compare Massachusetts search and seizure provisions, supra
note IS, and those of the fourth amendment, supra note \09.
165. People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975).
166. Id at 562, 227 N.W.2d at 513.
167. Id at 565, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
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that none of the cases relied upon in White involved third-party
monitoring. 168
At least one state has required the suppression of warrantless
tape recordings based on a privacy interpretation of the fourth
amendment itself. In Montana, where the state's constitutional pri
vacy provision is similar to that of Alaska, 169 the state supreme court
relied heavily on the rationale of Katz to disallow one party consen
sual recordings. 17o The Montana court also noted that because
White was a plurality decision and had been decided on pre-Katz
law, its precedent was not binding. l7l
These decisions show that state courts have found ways to cir
cumvent White. Courts have chosen to disregard White, and rely
instead on Katz, to ascribe to White only limited force because of its
split opinion, or to rely instead on the White dissents. Courts have
rejected White because it was decided on pre-Katz law or because it
had not relied on third-party monitoring cases. A state supreme
court has at its discretion the implements to provide for broader pri
vacy guarantees in keeping with the spirit of Entick, Boyd, and an
expanding privacy doctrine. The erosion of White in the courts of
other states has shown that, should the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court choose to expand the right to privacy from electronic sur
veillance for its citizenry, it need not be constrained in its efforts by
White.
3.

The Need for Stronger Privacy Guarantees

In recent years, legal scholars, social scientists and others con
cerned with privacy have concluded that its basic feature is the abil
ity of an individual to control the flow of information about
himself. 172 Genuine concern has been expressed that the rising use
of police informers l73 and sprawling technology l74 pose a threat not
168. Id
169. The Montana right to privacy provision states: "The right of individual pri
vacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
170. State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 108, 117,582 P.2d 1216, 1217, 1222 (1978).
171. Id at 108,582 P.2d at 1217.
172. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 33, at 25; A. WESTIN, supra note 33, at 7;
Ruebhausen & Brim; Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189-90
(1965); Shils, supra note 108, at 281-82; Stone, supra note 152, at 1207.
173. One court has estimated that secret informers are used "tens of thousands of
times" annually in the United States. See Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 65 (9th Cir.)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). A commentator has de
scribed the growth of secret informers as a "sprawling mass-producing, self-perpetuating
system of spies and informers." Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 401.
174. See supra note 34.
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only to the value of open expression necessary in a free society, 175
but also to the ordinariness and simplicity of life. 176 Because the
Supreme Court has held, with only one exception over the last fifty
years, I77 that the fourth amendment imposes no meaningful re
straints on the use of spies and informers, it has been criticized· for
failure to exercise foresight in this problem. 178
The development of modern government bureaucracy and its
growing role in our lives have added a further dimension to the pri
vacy problem. The government's acquisition of information in con
nection with its licensing, taxing, and administrative duties l79 has led
some to conclude that, because our lives are more inextricably tied to
government today than in 1791, the fourth amendment's protection
of privacy should properly be viewed as extending to the preserva
tion of the individual's interest in keeping information away from
the "prying hands, eyes, and ears of the government."180 Ways in
which this may be achieved are discussed in the following section.
175. Frank, honest, and spontaneous private discussion as well as open discourse
has been recognized by courts as essential to our free society. See, e.g., United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
176. The fear of being spied upon may not only inhibit free public and private
expression, but may bring about changes in personal behavior. For example, one com
mentator has suggested that if an official entered his home, he might discover an unmade
bed, unwashed dishes, piles of clothing scattered about, etc., which would cause the resi
dent to feel exposed and embarrassed. Such an experience might cause the individual so
exposed to change small personal habits to avoid such future embarrassment. The com
mentator goes on to suggest that when discussing the grander aspects of liberty, we
should not lose sight of the other unnoticed day-to-day liberties we cherish as well.
Stone, supra note 152, at 1207.
177. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
178. Professor Stone for example has criticized: "These decisions ... are too
often conclusory in nature, poorly analyzed, and reflect a tendency to reach a given result
without normal concern over doctrine or the law's long term impact." Stone, supra note
152, at 1229.
179. For example, government agencies collect and maintain information in con
nection with the tax system, the welfare system, the social security system, for the licens
ing of automobile drivers, the operation of businesses, and professional practices. Jd. at
1239.
180. Jd. at 1209. Attempts to compare today's society and government to that of
1791 for the purpose of discovering what the framers of the fourth amendment would

enact today are of course entirely speculative. Professor Stone, observing the history of
early English cases like Entick, and Supreme Court decisions like Boyd, stated that "it
seems reasonable to conclude that, in prohibiting the unrestrained rummagings of gov
ernmental officials, the framers sought not only to protect property rights but also to
preserve the ability of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is revealed to others." Id. at 1208.
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TOWARDS A CONCRETE SURVEILLANCE STANDARD

The development of electronic surveillance doctrine has paral
leled the doctrine of search and seizure. 181 The analogy has ad
vanced in recent years as the analysis of electronic surveillance has
shifted from a trespass to a privacy perspective. 182 The analogy with
search and seizure has become imbalanced, however, because ad
vancing technology has afforded a greater potential for privacy
abuse of electronic surveillance than that associated with warrantless
searches. 183 The question remains unanswered whether such poten
tial for abuse would have been tolerated by the framers of the fourth
amendment. Observers have noted that the intent of the framers was
reasonably clear: Like Entick, the fourth amendment was written to
stem the abuses of the eighteenth century practice of issuing general
warrants. 184 In the eighteenth century, general warrants, not war
rantless searches, were the more greatly feared source of privacy
violation. 185
Had warrantless searches been abused in the eighteenth century
to the same extent as were general warrants, it is reasonable to expect
that there would have been a public outcry similar to that which
issued against the use of general warrants. 186 Similarly, had the po
tential for abuse of warrantless searches been perceived by the fram
ers to the same extent as was the potential for the abuse of general
181. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
183. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
184. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 410. For example, one commentator has ar
gued that the framers of the fourth amendment were concerned above all with the preser
vation of the individual's right to personal privacy and freedom from unwarranted
government surveillance. Stone, supra note 152, at 1271.
Another commentator has suggested that the real issue with general writs was that
they served to immunize the scope of executive seizure from judicial control. Amster
dam, supra note 154, at 412.
185. Not much is known about the extent of warrantless searches in the eighteenth
century aside from the fact that the common law recognized a warrantless search incident
to arrest. It is not certain whether this exception extended the privilege of warrantless
search beyond the body. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412. The real fear of eighteenth
century citizens seems to have been not a warrantless search of the person, but rather the
ransacking of houses and the taking of private papers and possessions. It was against
abuses such as that that both Lord Camden and James Otis argued, and about which the
framers of the fourth amendment were concerned. Id at 410, 412. The issuance of gen
eral writs was seen as such an abuse because the general writ did not describe the items
subject to seizure, nor require their inventory or return, thereby lending itself to the over
reaching effect of search on suspicion alone. Id at 412. It was this fear of the overreach
ing effects of warrants, not the fear of warrantless searches, to which the framers of the
fourth amendment responded. Id at 410.
186. See supra note 185.
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warrants, it is reasonable to expect that restrictions on the employ
ment of warrantless searches would have been written into the fourth
amendment beside the restrictions on searches under warrant. IS7 It
makes no sense that the framers of the fourth amendment would
have gone to express lengths to safeguard against the potential pri
vacy abuse of the search warrant, only to permit the employment of
warrantless searches to exact the same abuse by evading the fourth
amendment guarantee. ISS
When the court in Commonwealth v. Thorpe permitted the war
rantless electronic surveillance to stand as evidence, it demonstrated
an example of the futility of addressing a twentieth century problem
with an eighteenth century standard. The growing potential for pri
vacy abuse has been well documented and discussed. ls9 This poten
tial encompasses the same elements which caused apprehension to
the framers of the fourth amendment: a violation of the individual's
right to privacy from government surveillance l90 and the exercise of
executive seizures absent judicial supervision. '91 Yet, by statutory
construction, the Thorpe court removed the surveillance from fourth
amendment protections by exempting it from the warrant
187. This is a reasonable assumption in light of the fact that the framers of the
fourth amendment were not concerned at the time about warrantless searches, but rather
about overreaching warrants. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 410.
188. The fourth amendment guarantees that the people will be free from unreason
able searches and seizures and that warrants will be issued only upon showing of prob
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, with specific description of the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. See supra note 110. The purpose of the
search warrant is to assure that the decision whether there is probable cause to search or
seize be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, rather than the officer engaged in
the investigation. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Melendez v.
Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass. 1973). The guarantee that a neutral and detached
magistrate will make the probable cause determination is evaded where a court permits
the search or seizure to stand without a warrant. See Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1827,424 N.E.2d 250 (probable cause determination made by local police
officials conducting the investigation).
The important issue presented by Thorpe is not only the presence or absence of
probable cause for the seizure, but also who is to make the determination.
189. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
190. At least one commentator has argued that privacy and freedom from govern
ment surveillance was the primary concern of the framers. See Stone, supra note 152, at
1271. For authorities describing the growing threat of government surveillance by elec
tronic means, see supra note 33.
191. One commentator has suggested that the real issue with general writs was that
they immunized the scope of executive seizures from judicial control. It was for this
reason that warrants were required by the fourth amendment to be sworn by oath or
affirmation, with a particularity of description of persons, places and things to be
searched. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412. Where there is no warrant, as in Thorpe,
the potential exists for evading this constitutional control.
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requirement. 192
While such construction has been permitted by United States v.
White,193 the doctrine should not go unquestioned. The Supreme
Court has stated that police must, whenever possible, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant pro
cedure. 194 The continued existence of the "assumption of risk" doc
trine serves to undermine that mandate. Warrantless electronic
surveillance poses the same threat to freedom and privacy today that
general warrants did two hundred years ago. 195 Both forms of
search and seizure deserve equal treatment under the constitution.
One possible solution would be to examine the policies behind
permitting warrantless searches, and then permit warrantless elec
tronic surveillances only where such policies are similarly served.
The following exceptions to the warrant requirement have been
recognized: hot pursuit;196 stop and frisk;197 search incident to ar
rest; 198 and various forms of consensual and administrative
192. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1837-38,424 N.E.2d at 256.
193. In While, the Supreme Court upheld warrantless evidence contained in a con
sensual recording, stating that it did not violate the fourth amendment. 401 U.S. at 754.
194. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968).
195. Justice Brandeis thought general warrants were "but puny instruments of tyr
anny and oppression compared with wire-tapping." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
at 476 (Brandeis J., dissenting).
196. No warrant is required when police are in immediate pursuit of a suspect if
they have personal knowledge or reliable information about his whereabouts. See, e.g.,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (evidence admissible when police entered and
searched a house without warrant to which an armed robber was reported by a witness to
have fled).
197. Without probable cause to make an arrest, a police officer may stop a suspi
cious person, question him and, for his own protection if he reasonably believes him to
be armed, pat his outer clothing for a weapon. I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 179, at 360-62 (C. Torcia 13th ed. 1972). See, e.g., Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979) (police officer's search valid when a suspect after being stopped, refused to identify
himself); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (evidence admissible when officer
noticed revolver under jacket as suspect fled car); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (evidence admissible when police officer searched suspect in response to tip from
known informer); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (evidence admissible when detective
patted down two men seen patrolling in front of store and conferring periodically). Bul
see United States ex reI. Richardson v. Rundle, 325 F. Supp. 1262, (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd
on olher grounds, 461 F.2d 860 (3d CiT. 1972), cerro denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973) (defend
ant was not suspected of any definite crime and police officer had no reason to believe
suspect to be armed and dangerous).
198. After defendant's arrest, a warrantless search may be conducted as incident to
the arrest. If the arrest is lawful, the incidental search will also be lawful. I WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 180, supra note 197, § 180, at 363-73. See, e.g., Cupp V. Mur
phy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (when suspected strangler voluntarily came to a police station
for questioning, evidence of blood and fingernail samples taken without warrant was
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searches. l99 With the exception of consensual and administrative
searches, the policy underlying these exceptions is what is usually
called either exigent circumstances 200 or necessitous haste. 2ol This
policy permits a search and seizure without a warrant where speed is
essential or delay would endanger the lives of the authorities or other
innocent persons. 202
Exigent circumstances do not usually exist in the context of elec
tronic surveillance where time is normally not so critical as to pre
clude the obtaining of a warrant. 203 The only consistent exception to
admissible due to the evanescent nature of the evidence); Chime I v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (arresting officers may search arrestee's person to discover and remove weap
ons or prevent concealment or destruction of evidence).
199. These include: consent to search by the accused, I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 197, § 181, at 373; consent to search by third person, id. , § 182, at
390; border searches, 10. , § 184, at 399; and administrative inspections, 10., § 185, at '403.
200. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968) (dictum).
201. Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 412.
202. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
203. A sampling of electronic surveillance cases over the past ten years shows little
evidence of the presence of exigent circumstances. The general sense is that such surveil
lance is normally employed to detect general conspiratorial planning over a period of
time, premised on the general notion of a threat, rather than to combat the threat of
immediate acts of violence for which time is of the essence. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Klein
dienst, 645 F.2d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (surveillance of Black Panther Party between Jan
uary and June 1969 premised on general grounds of violent goals of organization and its
contacts with foreign radicals); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (sur
veillance by Justice Department of Jewish Defense League from October 1970 to June
1971 premised on general ground that the organization's anti-Soviet activities were detri
mental to the nation's foreign relations).
Some cases show a long lapse of time between the initial suspicion and the final
surveillance sufficient to afford an opportunity to obtain a warrant. See, e.g. , Forsyth v.
Kleindienst, 599 F .2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979) (FBI learned of anti-war conspiracy in June
1970, and conducted a wiretap of the conspirators between November 1970 and January
1971).
Many surveillance cases involve investigations of illegal possession or sale of drugs
or contraband based on tips or reasonable suspicion in situations where there is sufficient
time to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Miroyan v. United States, 439 U.S. 1338 (1978) (Drug
Enforcement Administration agents obtained warrant to install monitor on drug smug
gling aircraft); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977) (warrant obtained to
monitor suspected illegal gambling activities); United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d
528 (5th Cir. 1977) (warrant obtained in pursuit of investigation of drug dealing).
It is also common for the policing organization to cooperate or participate in the
monitored activity, such as by investigating a monitored conversation, or conducting or
arranging a sale of contraband. In situations such as this, where the policing organiza
tion controls the timing, it would be difficult to argue that exigent circumstances exist.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1973) (monitored conversation of liquor
store operator arranged and investigated through cooperation with state liquor depart
ment which was conducting the investigation); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (heroin sale negotiated with agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan
gerous Drugs); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619 (ED. Mich. 1979) (Drug
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this is where such surveillance may be authorized for purposes of
national security.204
The use of warrantless surveillance cannot be justified as fur
thering the aims of federal and state surveillance statutes. Statutes at
both federal and state levels tolerate electronic surveillance only for
the purpose of fighting organized crime. 205 The existence of exigent
circumstances in such a setting is unlikely because the surveillance
contemplated for such an aim is directed at the organizational as
pects of organized crime, such as planning and secret meetings. 206
As further illustration that warrantless surveillance is not essen
tial for fighting organized crime, the legislative history behind Title
III shows that the federal warrantless surveillance exceptions in sec
tion 2SII(2)(c)207 were intended largely to codify established case
law as it then existed,208 not specifically to fight organized crime as
was ,the rest of the statute. The continuing tolerance of warrantless
surveillance in the federal statute was an unrelated afterthought;
warrantless surveillance was not then, nor is it now, a component
logically or intrinsically necessary for the accomplishment of the
statute's expressed purpose. For this reason, it would in no way in
terfere with the purpose of the federal or state surveillance statutes if
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were to 'rule, as did the
Michigan Supreme Court, that the growing scope of surveillance
Enforcement Administration agents, working with a drug manufacturer, placed monitor
in chemical cans being delivered for a suspiciously large order).
The other area where electronic surveillance is often employed is the area of domes
tic disputes. Here again, the circumstances seldom indicate the presence of an exigent
situation. See, e.g., Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (phone tapped for
six month period by spouse suspicious of an extra-marital affair).
Exigent circumstances are, however, occasionally found in connection with elec
tronic surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1978)
(when government agent was solicited to set fire to building, the circumstances were con
sidered to constitute an emergency due to the known record of the suspect).
204. National security surveillances are not subject to the warrant requirements
contained in 18 U.S.c. § 2518. Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 575 (E.D. Mich.
1979).
205. See supra notes 41 & 77 and accompanying text.
206. The Senate report for Title III stated: "Organized criminals must hold meet
ings to lay plans. Where the geographical areas over which they operate is large, they
must use telephones. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques can intercept
these wire and oral communications." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74,
reprinledin 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2161. See also letter from Governor
Volpe to the Massachusetts House and Senate, supra note 77.
207. See supra note 37.
208. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-94, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2182.
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technolo gy 209 has made electronic surveillance outside the protec
tions of the fourth amendment no longer acceptable. Such a ruling
would have several beneficial effects. It would eliminate the poten
tial for abuse which permits after the fact acceptance of warrantless
surveillances through Thope-like definition-stretching. 210 It would
eliminate the anomaly that the area of greatest potential abuse
warrantless surveillance-is also the area of least control or protec
tion. 211 It would serve the specifically articulated intent of the Mas
sachusetts General Court by affording stricter supervision of
electronic surveillance by the judiciary.212 It would accomplish this
without detracting from the true intent of the statute which is to en
hance the state's ability to fight organized crime. 213
VI.

CONCLUSION

The effect of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's rul
ings in Thope and Jarabek is to alter the statutory definition of or
ganized crime to the judicially created concept of a "continuing
conspiracy." By broadening the definition, the court has facilitated
the encompassing of a greater range of activities. The court's action
will permit a greater incidence of electronic surveillance in Massa
chusetts for two reasons. First, because the state statute exempts
electronic surveillance from the warrant requirement if the surveil
lance concerns investigations of organized crime, a broader defini
tion of organized crime will permit a broader incidence of electronic
surveillance. Second, because the Thope-Jarabek "continuing con
209. See supra note 33.
210. By broadening the definition of organized crime, increased levels of warrant
less surveillance will now be permissible because almost any conspiracy may be fitted
into the new definition. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
21t. The standard for warrantless surveillance in Massachusetts is now "reason
able suspicion." Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1837,424 N.E.2d at
256. The standard for surveillance requiring warrants, probable cause, is a stricter stan
dard. Id at 1835,424 N.E.2d at 255.
212. See supra notes 77 & 84 and accompanying text.
213. The problem with the definition of organized crime would still remain. The
problem would still exist if warrantless surveillance were eliminated because connection
to a designated offense would still be a requirement at a probable cause hearing to obtain
a warrant. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99E2 (West 1970). Such a system still
would be preferable to the present one because decisions made by the state's courts are
more likely to develop a uniform set of standards than are spontaneous decisions made
in police stations. Such a system would also be more in keeping with the legislative
mandate that electronic surveillance be strictly supervised by the judiciary. Finally, such
a system is more in keeping with the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreason
able searches and seizures because it would require the approval of a detached and neu
tral magistrate.
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spiracy" standard is imprecise as to what facts need to be shown,
future courts will have to interpret on a case by case basis. A court
desirous of upholding surveillance evidence is given broad leeway to
apply the definition loosely. At the very least, such broad grants of
discretion can lead to inconsistent results.
In Thorpe, the court justified the warrantless surveillance by in
corporating the "assumption of risk" doctrine from United States v.
White. The high courts of several other states have either distin
guished or disregarded White for the purpose of placing greater limi
tations on electronic surveillance and advancing the privacy rights of
their citizens. The same could have been done by the Supreme Judi
cial Court of Massachusetts.
The United States Supreme Court should re-consider White and
the "assumption of risk" doctrine. White's status as precedent has
been oft-criticized by commentators and judges. Modern electronic
surveillance is at least as great a threat to privacy as are searches and
seizures. Both forms of privacy invasion should receive equivalent
supervision under the fourth amendment. Yet warrantless electronic
surveillances in consensual situations continue to be a major loop
hole at both the state and federal level. One solution might be for
courts to apply an exigent circumstance limitation on warrantless
electronic surveillance as is done with warrantless searches.
Legislatures at both the state and federal level have stated their
intention to curtail and strictly control electronic surveillance. Spi
raling technology has enabled those who would spy to do so with
greater sophistication and ease, in contravention of that clear intent.
The courts and legislatures should begin now to readdress a problem
which has grown beyond the contemplation of earlier lawmakers.
William Hewig 111

